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Background: Considerable declines in malaria have accompanied increased funding for control since the year
2000, but historical failures to maintain gains against the disease underscore the fragility of these successes.
Although malaria transmission can be suppressed by effective control measures, in the absence of active
intervention malaria will return to an intrinsic equilibrium determined by factors related to ecology, efficiency of
mosquito vectors, and socioeconomic characteristics. Understanding where and why resurgence has occurred
historically can help current and future malaria control programmes avoid the mistakes of the past.
Methods: A systematic review of the literature was conducted to identify historical malaria resurgence events. All
suggested causes of these events were categorized according to whether they were related to weakened malaria
control programmes, increased potential for malaria transmission, or technical obstacles like resistance.
Results: The review identified 75 resurgence events in 61 countries, occurring from the 1930s through the 2000s.
Almost all resurgence events (68/75 = 91%) were attributed at least in part to the weakening of malaria control
programmes for a variety of reasons, of which resource constraints were the most common (39/68 = 57%). Over half
of the events (44/75 = 59%) were attributed in part to increases in the intrinsic potential for malaria transmission,
while only 24/75 (32%) were attributed to vector or drug resistance.
Conclusions: Given that most malaria resurgences have been linked to weakening of control programmes, there is
an urgent need to develop practical solutions to the financial and operational threats to effectively sustaining
today’s successful malaria control programmes.Background
The gains achieved against malaria in the past decade
have no parallel since the Global Malaria Eradication
Programme (GMEP), which ended in 1969 [1]. Increased
funding since 2000 has allowed scale-up of effective
interventions, and malaria has declined considerably in
many previously highly endemic parts of the world [2].
While these successes confirm that well-funded anti-
malaria interventions can have enormous impact, the
global increase in malaria burden that occurred in the
aftermath of the GMEP [3] underscores the potential
fragility of such gains. In 1972, when malaria was on the
rise after cessation of the GMEP, Bruce-Chwatt sug-
gested the term “resurgence” to refer to “the reappear-
malaria has subsided owing to the measures applied to
reduce or interrupt its transmission” [4]. Nájera later
clarified, “A malaria resurgence is actually the return to
a state of equilibrium which has been disturbed” [5] by
malaria control efforts.
Resurgence is the result of the fact that there is a cer-
tain intrinsic potential for malaria in an area, mathemat-
ically described by the basic reproduction number R0
[6]. Although malaria can be reduced from that baseline
by implementation of effective control measures, in the
absence of active suppression malaria will return to a
prevalence level determined by R0. This intrinsic potential
for malaria transmission may evolve slowly as a function of
socioeconomic development or environmental change.ance of new infections in significant numbers after Such structural changes may eventually result in sufficiently
low potential that active measures are not required to sup-* Correspondence: jcohen@clintonhealthaccess.org
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press transmission, but the malaria baseline will usually be
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activities [7]. The concept of resurgence as a return to-
wards a baseline level of malaria is distinct from that of
“rebound” [8], which is used to describe a hypothetical
overshoot that could occur in populations that have lost
their immunity.
Today, the threat of resurgence again looms as con-
strained global funding and competing priorities
threaten the sustainability of successes [9,10]. Brief
increases in malaria incidence in countries including
Rwanda and Zambia have raised fears about whether re-
cent gains against malaria can be sustained and extended
[2]. At the same time, it has been suggested that tech-
nical problems—such as insecticide resistance and
reduced effectiveness of insecticide-treated nets—may
complicate continued progress in countries including
Kenya [11] and Senegal [12]. Ensuring that today’s suc-
cessful malaria programmes learn from history rather
than repeat its mistakes requires a careful accounting of
what has gone wrong in the past and an understanding
of the factors that have driven those failures, whether
technical, operational, or financial. Accordingly, a sys-
tematic literature review was conducted to identify all
documented malaria resurgence events and the causes
to which they have been attributed.
Methods
Search strategy and selection criteria
The electronic databases PubMed, Web of Knowledge,
Scopus, and the World Health Organization’s WHOLIS
and regional office databases were searched for articles
documenting historical malaria resurgence events using
the search terms “malaria” and either “resurg*”, “ree-
merg*”, or “re-emerg*” (wild-card operators were used
to ensure that the search would identify “resurging”, “re-
surgence”, and any other form of the word). The
searches, conducted on Aug 1, 2011, included references
published on any date up until the day of the search and
included those published in English, French, or Spanish.
All records resulting from these searches were screened,
and full-text articles were assessed if the reference
appeared to describe or allude to a resurgence event. In
addition, the reference lists of all articles for which the
full text was reviewed were hand-searched, and the full
text of those references that appeared relevant to malaria
resurgence were retrieved.
Full-text articles were read to evaluate whether they
included mention of any resurgence event. Although the
term “resurgence” is sometimes used in a general, non-
specific way to refer to any increase in malaria, this re-
view defined a resurgence event more narrowly as:
An increasing trend in malaria incidence or prevalence
following suppression achieved through implementation
of control efforts.Accordingly, any report of an increase in malaria inci-
dence or prevalence in assessed articles was included in
analysis if it appeared to a) involve an increase over a
period of more than a single year or transmission season
(i.e., there was a upward “trend” over time and not just a
single aberrant season), and b) occur in a region where
endemic malaria had previously been reported but where
transmission had subsequently been suppressed to some
degree through anti-malarial interventions. Any refer-
ence to such an event, whether national or subnational,
was recorded, regardless of article type or quality.
Evaluation of causes
After compiling all resurgence events in the identified
citations that met these criteria, the same articles were
reviewed for suggested causes of those resurgence
events. Additionally, to identify potential causes suggested
elsewhere, the same databases as above were searched for
the name of the country involved and “malaria.” Search
results were limited to articles published within a few
years after the start of the resurgence event. The full-text
of all results of these searches that appeared likely to dis-
cuss potential causes of resurgence was read, and the
reference lists of these articles were hand-searched for
relevant sources.
A data extraction form was used by two reviewers to
classify all suggested causes for resurgence into categor-
ies. Three overarching categories were used to classify
causes: 1) weakening of the malaria programme, 2) in-
creasing intrinsic potential for malaria transmission, and
3) technical problems such as insecticide or drug resist-
ance. All suggested causes for resurgence were recorded
from each article, regardless of article type or quality of
evidence. Additionally, however, each suggested cause
was classified in regard to the degree of supporting evi-
dence into one of two levels: a) assertions, without quan-
titative analysis or detailed argument for why that factor
was a cause of resurgence, or b) evidence-based claims,
where in-depth qualitative or quantitative analysis was
used to provide evidence in support of the factor as a
cause. Suggested causes of resurgence for each docu-
mented resurgence event were independently evaluated
for category and level of evidence by the two reviewers,
and disagreements between the reviewers were resolved
by consensus.
Results
The database searches returned 1,470 records, and 240
additional records were identified from hand-searching
reference lists, producing a total of 927 unique records
screened after removal of duplicates (Figure 1). Of these,
393 appeared to describe or allude to malaria resurgence
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Figure 1 PRISMA [78] systematic review identification, screening, eligibility, and inclusion.
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mentioning specific examples of malaria resurgence, 39
(9.9%) were excluded for only citing resurgence events
by reference to other articles included this review, and
25 (6.4%) were excluded because the events described
were determined not to meet the definition of resur-
gence as described above. For example, increases in mal-
aria were described in regions such as the highlands of
north-eastern Tanzania [13] and western New Guinea [14],
but these two reports were excluded because evidence was
not provided that malaria had previously been actively sup-
pressed from higher levels. Reports of epidemics of malaria
that did not appear to represent a sustained trend were also
excluded, including outbreaks in Grenada, believed to be
sparked by recrudescence of an old infection [15]; Trinidad,
where an outbreak of 22 cases occurred in 1994–95 [16] (it
was also unclear whether transmission was truly being sup-
pressed before the advent of this outbreak); and Jamaica,
where an outbreak occurred 44 years after elimination [17],
among others. Thus 208 reports, describing 75 resurgenceevents in 61 countries, were included in the final analysis
(Table 1). The events varied greatly in magnitude and dur-
ation and occurred from the 1930s through the 2000s.Reported causes of resurgence
Suggested causes of resurgence fell into all three of the
general categories. These categories – which were not
mutually exclusive – included weakening of the malaria
control programme (68/75=91%), increases in the intrinsic
potential for malaria transmission (44/75=59%), and tech-
nical problems including drug and insecticide resistance
(24/75=32%). Subcategories of each are described below.
Only 45 of the 273 (16%) suggested causes for resur-
gence events identified by the review were classified by
reviewers as presenting in-depth qualitative or quantita-
tive analysis to support the assertion. Of these 45 sug-
gested causes, 27 (60%) implicated weakening of malaria
programmes, 15 (33%) increases in malaria potential,
and 3 (9%) technical problems such as resistance.
Table 1 Resurgence events identified by the systematic literature review and their suggested causes
Weakening of control activities Technical problems Increasing malaria potential






































Europe and Middle East
Spain 1936 1943 [47] [47] [47] [47] [47]
Italy 1941 1945 [5] [5]
Russia 1960 ? [52] [52] [52]
Azerbaijan 1969 1981 [89]
Afghanistan1970 1987 [26] [60] [26] [26] [26]
Turkey 1973 1977 [74] [74]
Tajikistan 1990 1997 [90] [29]
Azerbaijan 1990 1996 [28] [89] [28] [89] [28] [89] [28] [89]
Turkey 1990 1994 [91] [91]
Iran 1991 1999 [92] [92] [92] [92]




1948 1951 [22]* [22]* [22]*
Kenya
(highlands)
1956 1961 [19]* [19]* [19]*
Kenya
(Pare-Taveta)
1959 1962 [95]* [96]* [32]*
Cameroon
(Yaounde)
1960 1963 [33]* [34] [34]
Liberia 1961 ? [22]* [22]*
Zanzibar 1967 1983 [37] [97] [9]
Swaziland 1971 1996 [53] [21] [53] [21] [53]* [21] [53]* [21]

























Table 1 Resurgence events identified by the systematic literature review and their suggested causes (Continued)
Mauritius 1975 1982 [27] [27] [27] [27]
Madagascar
(highlands)
1976 1988 [40] [40] [40]
Kenya
(Kisumu)
1977 ? [42] [42] [101]
Ethiopia
(Debre Zeit)
1980 1991 [25]* [25]* [25]* [25]*
Mayotte 1981 1984 [102] [102]
Sudan
(Khartoum)




1985 2003 [43] [100] [43] [43] [43]
Zanzibar 1989 1997 [23]* [23]*
Kenya
(highlands)








1990 1994 [106] [106]
Zimbabwe 1995 2007 [107] [108]
South
Africa
1995 2000 [97] [97] [109] [61]* [109]
Asia
China 1960 1970 [31] [31]
Sri Lanka 1964 1969 [26] [20] [26] [26] [26]
India 1965 1976 [110] [26] [18]*[110] [18] [18]* [110] [18] [111] [18] [111,112]
Pakistan 1967 1972 [26] [26] [81]
Myanmar 1968 2008 [20] [20] [20] [20] [20]
Thailand 1970 1981 [20] [20] [20] [20] [20] [20]
Nepal 1971 1986 [20] [20] [20] [20] [20]
Bangladesh 1971 1994 [20] [48]* [113] [48]* [20] [20] [20] [48]* [113] [48]* [48]* [48]*
Bhutan 1972 1994 [20] [20] [20]
Vietnam 1979 1991 [49]* [49]* [49] [49] [49]
Pakistan 1980 1992 [64]* [114]* [114] [58]* [114]*

















Table 1 Resurgence events identified by the systematic literature review and their suggested causes (Continued)
India
(Bombay)






1995 2000 [117] [118]
Americas
Nicaragua 1960 1968 [26] [26] [119]
Paraguay 1961 1967 [120]
Bolivia 1965 1979 [121] [122] [122]
Belize 1971 1983 [123] [45] [123]
Brazil 1974 1992 [123] [44] [124] [44] [44]
French
Guiana
1975 1990 [54] [41] [54] [54] [125] [41] [54] [41] [54]
Haiti 1976 1982 [123]
Guatemala 1976 1998 [123] [45] [123]
Colombia 1976 1998 [126] [75]
Dominican
Republic
1978 1982 [123] [123]
Mexico 1979 1985 [127] [128] [128] [127]
Ecuador 1980 1990 [123] [75]* [127]
Peru 1981 1998 [75] [129] [129]
Guyana 1983 1991 [75] [130] [130]
Nicaragua 1983 1996 [131] [26] [131] [131]* [131] [131]
Costa
Rica
1990 1998 [54] [54] [54] [5] [54] [5] [54]
Belize 1991 1994 [132]* [133]
Suriname 1992 2001 [134] [134]
Ecuador 1996 2002 [135] [135] [135] [135]
Panama 2001 2004 [136] [137] [137]
Pacific
Indonesia 1963 1973 [26] [26] [26] [26]
Malaysia
(Sabah)
1967 1978 [26] [26] [26] [26] [26]























Indonesia 1997 2000 [140]* [141]* [140]*
Vanuatu 1999 2003 [142] [142]
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Programmatic weakening was attributed to a variety of
causes (which are not mutually exclusive), including fund-
ing shortages (37/68= 54%), complacency and other issues
with poor execution (32/68= 47%), war or disaster (17/
68 = 25%), purposeful cessation of control activities (17/
68 = 25%), community non-cooperation (7/68 = 10%), or
unknown or unstated factors (7/68= 10%). The effects of
programmatic weakening are illustrated by the increases in
malaria that accompanied the scaling down of indoor re-
sidual spraying (IRS) in much of Latin America (Figure 2).
Funding issues were the single most commonly cited
reason for resurgence, mentioned in 37/75 (49%) events.
Many of these involved time-limited bilateral commit-
ments that funded interventions too costly to continue
once the funding period had ended. For example, USAID
provided DDT to India for an eradication programme at
the end of the 1950s, which led to a very large reduction
in the malaria burden, from an estimated 100 million an-
nual cases in the early 20th century to about 100 thousand
cases in 1965 [18]. When the USAID commitment ended,
however, India proved unable to procure or produce the
necessary insecticide to continue the programme, with
over a 30% shortfall in 1965–66. Insufficient DDT was
likely a key factor resulting in a resurgence of malaria to a
peak of 6 million cases by 1976 [18] (Figure 3). In the
western Kenyan highlands, three WHO-supported spray-
ings of dieldrin reduced malaria prevalence to 0.5-2.0%,
after which the cost of malaria control was transferred to
the local government in 1957. Since the cost of spraying
was equivalent to the entire health budget for the district,
the programme was terminated, and a “striking increase”
in malaria had occurred by 1959 [19].
Reasons for funding reductions or cessation were not
clear for all events, but in several, donors appear to have
reallocated funding specifically because successful reduc-
tions in malaria burden had occurred. In Thailand, for
example, bilateral assistance for malaria control was
phased out in 1970 following reductions of the slide
positivity rate (SPR) to 1.7% in 1969; within six years the
SPR had risen to 8.0% [20]. In Swaziland, the reduction
of malaria to the point that it was no longer perceived as
a public health problem in the 1950s resulted in signifi-
cant cut-backs in funding to the WHO-funded control
programme, including reductions of the staff from 36 to
only seven at the end of the 1960s; significant malaria
epidemics involving thousands of cases followed [21].
The reliance of malaria programmes on a few major
donors has meant that any change in donor priorities may
put continued suppression of malaria at risk. A US-led
campaign in Monrovia, Liberia, caused hospital admis-
sions at the public hospital to decrease by about 95% be-
tween 1945 and 1947. Thereafter, the programme was
deemed too expensive, the budget was cut by 80% in1948, and by 1950 an assessment concluded that control
measures were no longer having any impact on transmis-
sion [22]. In Zanzibar, a USAID project in the 1980s was
terminated, despite having about $US 1 million in undis-
bursed funds, due to the perception that the project was a
failure [23], and malaria rates on the island of Pemba rose
from 23.2% in 1989 [23] to over 60% in 1994 [24]. In Ethi-
opia, funding from USAID and WHO was halted in 1974
following the overthrow of the government by a military
regime [25]. DDT application to households plummeted
from a 1974 peak of 117,040 houses to only 8,139 houses
in 1985. Incidence increased from 1.1 cases per 1,000
person-years in 1980 to 65.9 cases per 1,000 person-years
in 1989 [25]. Similarly, in Indonesia, a DDT programme
protecting 17 million people by 1959 was scaled back fol-
lowing withdrawal of assistance from the USA during a
tumultuous political period in the early 1960s [26], and
malaria increased from <6,000 cases in 1963 to 346,000 in
1973 [20].
In 32/75 events (43%), the weakening of operations for
reasons other than funding shortfalls was blamed for sub-
sequent resurgence. In several examples, this weakening
was attributed to a sense of complacency within the
programme or government resulting from the perception
that malaria was no longer a threat. In these examples,
commentators do not suggest that insufficient resources
were available, nor that programmes were purposefully
halted; instead they indicate that the programmes failed to
operate sufficiently well despite the apparent availability of
resources to do so. In Mauritius, for example, successful
certification of elimination was said to have led to a lax-
ness in control: regular testing for malaria was halted and
vector control was scaled back, providing an ideal envir-
onment for malaria to return following the trigger of a
natural disaster [27].
In 17/75 events (41%), war, strife, or natural disaster
disrupted programme operations and prevented contin-
ued suppression of malaria. For example, in the wake of
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, war and strife
damaged control efforts throughout the region even as
the Soviet support for interventions vanished. The
Nagorno-Karabakh civil war in Azerbaijan in the early
1990s interrupted control efforts [28], while war in
Tajikistan similarly contributed to disruption and resur-
gence of malaria [29] (Figure 4). In Myanmar, the na-
tional malaria control programme lowered incidence
from 217 per 1,000 in 1950 to 65 per 1,000 in 1957 (with
a prevalence of only 0.11%) [20]. Troubles beset the
programme in the 1960s and 1970s, however, and mal-
aria metrics crept upwards; following rebellion and
chaos in 1988, slide prevalence doubled from 7.3% in
1987 to 14.0% in 1992, and then continued increasing to
46.4% in 2010 [30]. In China, malaria was reduced from





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2 Malaria resurgence in Latin America appears strongly correlated with weakened IRS programmes [75]. The blue line represents
slide positivity (left axis) and the pink bars depict the number of houses sprayed with IRS per 1,000 population [54,79]. Gray bars represent
averages of surrounding years where no data on IRS was available in a particular year (otherwise the lack of a bar indicates zero houses sprayed).
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were reported in 1960 [31].
In 17/75 events (23%), malaria interventions were pur-
posefully halted, often because they were intended as
time-limited experimental pilots rather than ongoing
programmes, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5).
In Central Liberia, for example, WHO and UNICEF
started funding one of the first pilot projects intended to
examine whether eradication was possible in Africa in
1953; cessation of WHO involvement in 1961 led to
rapid deterioration [22]. In Pare and Taveta on the
Kenyan-Tanzanian border, malaria was greatly reduced
from 1956–59, but it resurged to pre-intervention levels
within three years after the pilot ended [32]. In Yaounde,
Cameroon, pilot spraying began in 1954 and produced
“excellent results” [33], but cessation of spraying in 1960
resulted in complete recovery of the vector [33] with
subsequent increases in malaria [34]. And in Garki, Ni-
geria, prevalence resurged rapidly from <5% prevalence
back to a baseline of around 50% following the cessation
of the intervention [35].Purposeful decisions to halt successful malaria pro-
grammes have also occurred outside of experimental situa-
tions. In Zanzibar, a WHO-supported IRS programme
reduced malaria prevalence from 76% in 1957 to <5%
in 1967 [9], after which Sheik Karume suspended the
programme due to his stated belief that Africans were
“malaria-proof” [36]. Resurgence rapidly followed cessa-
tion of the spraying, and by 1973 prevalence had returned
to 54% on the island of Unguja [37]. Elsewhere, countries
followed WHO’s eradication guidance and withdrew all
vector control measures from regions where malaria had
apparently been interrupted [38], in some cases despite
lacking sufficiently strong surveillance to maintain elimin-
ation in the absence of vector control. In Sri Lanka, for
example, a highly successful IRS campaign reduced
malaria from 2.8 million cases in 1946 to only 17 (11 of
which were imported) in 1963 [20]. Cessation of spraying
following the subsequent move from attack to con-
solidation in 1964 [39], exacerbated by weakened sur-
veillance and increased population movement for
mining and agriculture [26], led to a very large
Figure 3 Malaria resurgence in Asia and Eastern Europe followed weakening – both intentional and accidental – of malaria control
programmes. Resurgence followed general deterioration of control programmes in Bhutan, Indonesia [20,80], Pakistan [81], and Solomon Islands
[82]; purposeful weakening of activities in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand [20,80]; and insufficient funding and resources for vector control in India
[20,80] and Turkey [83].
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to 538,000 in 1969 [20]. In Madagascar, an eradica-
tion campaign reduced malaria to very low incidence
in a few residual foci by 1960. By 1979, even prophy-
laxis and treatment centers were closed, and without
the checks of either IRS or chemotherapy, the malaria
incidence began to rise at a rapid rate [40]. Reintro-
duction of DDT spraying brought malaria back under
control [40].
In 7/75 (9%) of events, resurgence was attributed to
decreases in community acceptance or participation in mal-
aria programmes. In French Guiana, it was suggested that
resistance of domestic pests, such as cockroaches, to in-
secticide spraying caused the population to lose confidence
in the effectiveness of IRS [41]. Declining compliance withspray campaigns may have contributed to resurgence in
Kisumu, Kenya [42], São Tomé and Príncipe [43], and
Sabah, Malaysia [26], among others.
Increases in malaria potential
Increases in intrinsic malaria potential were attributed to a
variety of causes (which are not mutually exclusive), includ-
ing movement of humans or mosquitoes (32/44=73%), de-
velopment and land-use changes (19/44=43%), climate or
weather (11/44=25%), war and civil strife (8/44=18%),
and worsening of socioeconomic conditions (5/44=11%).
The most common rationale for why increased trans-
mission potential may have contributed to resurgence
involved the movement of humans and mosquitoes and
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Figure 4 Malaria resurgence has followed war, population movement, and associated disruptions in Europe and Asia. Resurgences
followed wars and social tumult in Spain, Italy [5], Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia [83], Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka [20,80], and began in
soldiers in the demilitarized zone in Republic of Korea [84,85].
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http://www.malariajournal.com/content/11/1/122Brazil, for example, nearly one million immigrants
moved into the Amazon region during the 1970s seeking
new farmland and attracted by gold mining in the re-
gion. The increase in susceptible individuals in the re-
ceptive region, combined with a possible influx of
infections from endemic Bolivia, may have contributed
to the rapid rise in malaria incidence in the late 1970s
and early 1980s [44]. In Thailand at the end of the
1960s, surveillance struggled to detect cases among a
mobile population that traveled back and forth from en-
demic areas [20], while Afghanistan’s nomadic population
created similar challenges in the early 1970s [26]. The mi-
gration of farmhands from neighbouring endemic coun-
tries to Belize in the 1970s fueled transmission [45], while
movement of infected mosquitoes across the Demilitar-
ized Zone between the Koreas is believed to have sparked
resurgence of malaria in Republic of Korea 14 years afterelimination [46]. Movement of refugees and soldiers from
wars across countries and decades has been implicated as
a cause of malaria resurgence, including in Spain [47],
Bangladesh [48], Vietnam [49], Sri Lanka [50], Sudan [51],
and Azerbaijan [28].
Nineteen of the 75 events (25%) were at least partially
attributed to changes in development or industry, in-
cluding agricultural development, creation of dams or
highways, or other land-use changes. For example, in
the USSR, new irrigation and construction of hydroelec-
tric power stations may have increased breeding sites for
mosquitoes in the 1960s and 1970s [52]. In Swaziland,
development of sugar plantations in the receptive low-
veld of the country involved bringing large numbers of
potentially infected Mozambican workers into a region
where increased agriculture had increased the potential






















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5 Malaria resurgence in Africa followed cessation of pilot programmes and relaxation of control activities. Cessation of pilot
programmes in Pare-Taveta [86,87], Garki [35], and Gezira [5] resulted in rapid resurgence to baseline levels, while weakening or halting of control
activities in Kapsabet in the western Kenyan highlands [19], Zanzibar (twice) [9], Mauritius [27], Madagascar [40], and Swaziland [88] similarly led to
the return of malaria in these areas.
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http://www.malariajournal.com/content/11/1/122development of the banana industry exacerbated malaria
by moving workers from endemic areas into regions
with increased suitability for vector breeding [5], while
simultaneously reducing the coverage of malaria control
programmes to protect them [54].
Eleven of the 75 resurgence events (15%) were attribu-
ted at least in part to climate or weather. In Debre Zeit,
Ethiopia, malaria rates rebounded in the 1980s after hav-
ing been successfully suppressed with extensive use of
DDT. During this period of increasing malaria rates,
positive correlations existed between temperatures and
monthly malaria incidence [25]. In Kenya’s western high-
lands, warming temperatures may have played a role in
an increase in epidemic malaria during the 1990s [55].
However, the importance of such factors is controversial
given the many other important changes occurring inthe region during that time period, including the emer-
gence of chloroquine resistance [56,57]. Increasing tem-
peratures were also suggested as a cause of resurgence
in northern Pakistan [58].
Eight of the 75 events (11%) involved increases in
transmission potential attributed to war or strife, while
another five (7%) were said to be related to a worsening
of socioeconomic circumstances. For example, war in
Bangladesh in the early 1970s uprooted millions of
people and destroyed homes, and, even if the malaria
programme had been able to continue its efforts, the
lack of stable communities would have made continued
control extremely difficult [48]. In 1969, before war
began, fewer than 100,000 cases of malaria were
reported, but a few years after the war, annual incidence
had tripled [20].
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Malaria resurgence was attributed primarily to two types
of technical problems: vector (14/23 = 61%) and drug
(15/23 = 65%) resistance. In 14 of the 75 events (19%),
vector resistance to insecticides was suggested as a cause of
resurgence. For example, in Nicaragua, an eradication
programme failed in 1960 when resistance to dieldrin and
DDT was coupled with a shortage of funds, with malaria
returning to original levels [26]; DDT was among the
cheapest pesticides available, and switching to new insecti-
cides involved an increase in costs at a time when funds
were scarce [59]. In Afghanistan, “already deficient opera-
tions” were unable to cope with the development of DDT
resistance despite an infusion of funding from the USSR
in the early 1970s. Malaria incidence there increased
from <20,000 cases in 1970 to 127,000 in 1976 [26], and
the subsequent invasion of the country by the USSR fin-
ished off the malaria control programme [60]. Increasing
DDT resistance of mosquitoes in Java may have been an
important contributor of resurgence through 1973 [26]. In
the USSR, apparent behavioural changes in the vector
population were stated to have negatively impacted the
programme in the early 1960s [52].
Drug resistance was implicated as a cause of resur-
gence in 15/75 events (20%). For example, quantitative
analysis of factors contributing to resurgence of malaria
in South Africa in the 1990s demonstrated that drug re-
sistance was associated with malaria incidence [61],
probably because infections that were not effectively
treated remained to contribute towards onwards trans-
mission. Similarly, resistance to chloroquine has been
suggested as a likely candidate for explaining increases
in malaria in the western Kenyan highlands [56,62,63]
and northern Pakistan [64].
Discussion
Malaria programmes today face an uncertain future, with
the funding available for prevention and treatment pro-
jected to decline over the next several years [10]. The
results of this systematic review highlight the existential risk
to control programmes posed by this deterioration in fund-
ing. The review found that the single most common sug-
gested cause of resurgence involved a weakening of malaria
programmes following funding disruptions. Leading mal-
aria actors and donors have mobilized to address some of
the other resurgence threats identified here, including sig-
nificant, if still insufficient, efforts to combat the threat of
drug [65] and insecticide [66] resistance. However, com-
paratively limited attention, investment, or action has been
devoted to developing practical solutions to financial and
operational threats to successful malaria control, despite
their apparent importance. At their core, most of these fi-
nancial and operational hazards result from the same “out
of sight, out of mind” paradox: the more successful theprogramme is, the less visible the disease becomes, and the
greater the risk that its funding will be withdrawn or its
operations will be conducted lackadaisically [67]. As a result,
effective solutions will need to address this root cause, find-
ing ways to sustain the interest of donors, managers, and
populations, and increasing the duration and predictability
of financial commitments.
This paradox of success is not unique to malaria, and
there is considerable experience across public health in
continuing vital financing and implementation of pro-
grammes in the absence of disease. A primary example
is that of vaccination against diseases such as measles,
rubella, pertussis, and diphtheria [68]. Similar challenges
exist for sustainable immunization campaigns, since par-
ents who no longer perceive the threat of these diseases
to their children may choose not to vaccinate [69], while
politicians may not see the value of continuing to com-
mit resources for a disappearing disease [70]. The ability
of vaccination programmes to achieve continued high
coverage rates even in countries where the targeted dis-
eases are no longer visible threats [71] attests to broad
understanding of the importance of maintaining these
campaigns amongst communities and decision-makers.
Success in preventing malaria resurgence requires a
paradigm shift from a focus on short-term burden re-
duction towards an immunization-like programme of
routine activities planned and budgeted for the long-
term, regardless of the present burden of disease [72].
Nearly all of the 75 resurgence events identified through
this review have been ascribed to some aspect of weaken-
ing of the malaria control programme, whether because of
funding shortages, complacency following successful reduc-
tions, or disruptions caused by war or natural disaster.
These results suggest that technical problems such as vec-
tor resistance appear historically to have been of second-
ary importance for resurgence to financial and operational
factors [73]. The critical causes of resurgence in these
events were not the failures of technical solutions; they
were the failures of malaria programmes to implement the
technical solutions sufficiently well. In India, for example,
resistance to DDT, although widely present, was not con-
sidered a primary cause of resurgence because of the ef-
fectiveness of alternative insecticides and the fact that
DDT remained partially effective despite the resistance
[18]. In Turkey, despite high levels of resistance, resur-
gence was attributed to “operational deficiencies stem-
ming from administrative and financial constraints” [74].
These results do not mean that technical problems such
as resistance are of no consequence. Observers of malaria
resurgence almost always suggest multi-factorial causes.
Contributing factors can range from the proximate (e.g.,
DDT spraying was halted) to the distal (e.g., success against
the disease bred complacency and reallocation of funds to
more pressing health areas). One of DDT’s chief advantages
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use it due to resistance were required to switch to more ex-
pensive insecticides, raising the cost of interventions and
making them harder to sustain [75]. If, however, resistance
to multiple pesticides was the primary driver of resurgence,
it would have been extremely difficult to counteract, since
vector control, one of the most effective tools available to
malaria control programmes, would have proven useless.
Instead, however, regions that made a determined effort
were able to continue to make gains against malaria despite
the obstacle of resistance. In Indonesia, for example, Gra-
miccia and Beales blame continued resurgence through
1973 on both insecticide and drug resistance, but note that
despite these problems, “intensified anti-malarial measures”
were able to greatly reduce malaria following reimplemen-
tation post-resurgence [26]. It may also be true that tech-
nical problems like resistance develop over longer
timelines, and as such could potentially become more im-
portant for programmes that successfully establish sus-
tained control measures based on stable funding sources.
This review has a number of limitations. Although sys-
tematic, it may have missed any examples of resurgence
not documented in the literature or published outside the
databases searched. It may also have excluded true resur-
gence events where insufficient evidence of both an in-
creasing trend and successful prior control was evident in
the literature. The magnitudes of resurgence events were
not distinguished in this review due to limitations in histor-
ical data on malaria incidence and prevalence. The oper-
ational importance of a very small increase in malaria
burden over time may be quite different from that of a large
increase, although both constitute “resurgence” under the
definition presented here. It is also plausible that the
reports reviewed here may have missed important contrib-
uting factors in some cases. The frequency with which cer-
tain factors were cited as causes and the paucity of others
may be influenced by the research interests of the authors
who described them, or perhaps by their affiliations: those
associated with national control programmes, for example,
may be less likely to implicate programmatic weakening as
a cause of resurgence.
This review did not attempt to assess the validity of
claims about the causes of resurgence, but instead merely
attempted to grade the amount of evidence presented to
support each claim. In general, that evidence appears thin:
only 16% of claims about the causes of resurgence were
found to provide substantial support for their assertions.
This review reveals several challenges in evaluating claims
about resurgent malaria and its causes, including uneven or
unknown malaria baselines, generally poor surveillance
during periods of resurgence, and lack of a research infra-
structure during the critical periods of interest. Limiting the
analyzed causes to only those proposed in articles that pro-
vided in-depth analysis of resurgence, however, would notchange the results presented here: programmatic weakening
was still implicated in themajority (60%) of those articles.
Accordingly, the lesson for today’s malaria programmes is
that they must plan carefully to maintain suppressive activ-
ities until such a time that no intrinsic potential for trans-
mission remains. It is important to note that many
countries have succeeded in doing so. Feachem and collea-
gues identified 50 programmes that successfully eliminated
malaria, predominately during the GMEP [76]. Of these,
only four – Armenia, Mauritius, Republic of Korea, and
republics of the former USSR – were found in this review
to have suffered resurgence in subsequent years. The list of
countries that have avoided resurgence include several,
such as Taiwan [77], that had high intrinsic transmission
potential and were reliant on donor funding to counteract
it, belying the notion that such an achievement is beyond
the reach of resource-constrained malaria programmes.
Contrary to common assumption, the countries currently
pursuing malaria elimination and control are not much
poorer or weaker than those that have successfully sus-
tained control and elimination in the past. Countries
attempting to eliminate today have essentially identical
mean GDP per capita to the successful eliminators of the
1960s that have succeeded in avoiding resurgence for dec-
ades [76].
Over many decades, socio-economic development and
health system strengthening may reduce the intrinsic po-
tential of a region for malaria transmission. In this case,
continued control interventions may no longer be neces-
sary to maintain a low burden of malaria. In the interim,
however, the global malaria community possesses tools that
have been proven to work in reducing illness and death
from malaria. Finding ways to maintain the funding, polit-
ical will, and strong operational capacity to continue to use
those tools over the long-term is imperative to ensure that
the dramatic progress that has been achieved through inter-
national investment is sustained and extended.
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